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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the lower court err in interpreting the parties' lease agreement to read 
that Rite Aid could offset its property tax reimbursement payments made in one calendar 
year against percentage rental payments accruing in a different calendar year? 
Standard of review: Correctness. Interpretation of the terms of a contract 
is a question of law. An appellate court will accord no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions regarding the contract and will review them for correctness. Nova Cas. Co. 
v. Able Constr. Inc.. 983 P.2d 575, 577-78 (Utah 1999). 
2. Did the lower court err in holding that Rite Aid could demand 
reimbursements of percentage rent overpayments several years after the fact, when Rite 
Aid had failed to exercise its option for deductions during the time required by the parties' 
lease agreement? 
Standard of review: Correctness. Because entitlement to summary judgment 
is a question of law, an appellate court accords no deference to the trial court's resolution 
of the legal issues presented. An appellate court determines only whether the trial court 
erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly made a 
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determination as to the presence of disputed issues of material fact. Glover ex rel. Dyson 
v.Roy Scouts. 923 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Utah 1996) 
3. Did the lower court err in finding that Rite Aid was not in default of the 
parties' lease agreement and in denying Hillside's unlawful detainer claim? 
Standard of review: Correctness. Because entitlement to summary judgment 
is a question of law, an appellate court accords no deference to the trial court's resolution 
of the legal issues presented. An appellate court determines only whether the trial court 
erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly made a 
determination as to the presence of disputed issues of material fact. Glover ex rel. Dyson 
v Roy Scouts. 923 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Utah 1996). 
4. Did the lower court err in awarding Rite Aid attorneys fees and interest 
against Hillside when Hillside was never in material breach of the parties' lease agreement, 
but was, at worst, the unwitting holder of gratuitous and mistaken overpayments 
voluntarily made by Rite Aid and only retracted by Rite Aid several years after the fact? 
Standard of review: Correctness. Whether attorneys fees [and costs] are 
recoverable in a given action is a question of law, which an appellate court reviews for 
correctness. Also, whether the trial court's findings of fact in support of an award of 
attorneys fees are sufficient is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). 
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5. Did the lower court err in awarding Rite Aid attorneys fees and interest 
against Hillside when Hillside was never in material breach of the parties' lease agreement, 
but was rather arguing a good-faith interpretation of the lease, which position was 
necessitated by an arguably ambiguous provision of the lease drafted by Rite Aid and by 
Rite Aid's own careless and dilatory behavior in mistakenly making overpayments, and 
then demanding the same in their entirety for the first time several years after the fact? 
Standard of review. Correctness. Whether attorneys fees [and costs] are 
recoverable in a given action is a question of law, which an appellate court reviews for 
correctness. Also, whether the trial court's findings of fact in support of an award of 
attorneys fees are sufficient is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). 
6. Did the lower court err in awarding Rite Aid its attorneys fees and costs 
where they were not submitted to the lower court by way of an affidavit of attorneys fees 
and costs as required by Rule 4-505 of the Utah Rules of Administration, but rather were 
submitted for the first time in Rite Aid's proposed Order, thereby depriving Hillside of any 
meaningful opportunity to review the basis for or reasonableness of such claimed fees and 
costs? 
Standard of review. Correctness. In determining whether a trial court 
correctly applied the governing law, an appellate court will give no deference to the trial 
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court's legal conclusions, but will review them for correctness. S.W. Energy Corp. v. 
ContMIns. Co.. 1999 UT 23, 974 P.2d 1239, 1f 11. 
7. Did the lower court err in awarding interest for sums at issue prior to April 
1999, the first date Hillside was apprised of the mistaken overpayments in its possession? 
Standard of review. Correctness. A trial court's decision to grant or deny 
prejudgment interest presents a question of law which an appellate court reviews for 
correctness. Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d 616, 1 73. 
8. Did the lower court err in awarding Rite Aid interest during periods when 
Rite Aid offset its claimed overpayments against accruing rental payments it otherwise 
owed Hillside, and as such, during periods when Hillside no longer had possession or the 
benefit of the monies being offset? 
Standard of review. Correctness. A trial court's decision to grant or deny 
prejudgment interest presents a question of law which an appellate court reviews for 
correctness. Lyon v. Burton. 2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d 616, f 73. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This case involves the interpretation of several contractual 
provisions of the parties' commercial lease agreement, in particular a provision allowing the 
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tenant's property tax reimbursement payments to be deducted from percentage rent payments 
for particular time periods. 
Course of Proceedings. On March 30, 2000, Rite Aid filed a Complaint seeking: 
(1) a declaration that Rite Aid was not in monetary default of its lease rental obligations (by 
virtue of having offset certain property tax reimbursement payments against certain 
percentage rent obligations, albeit several years after the fact); and (2) refund of percentage 
rent payments for certain past calendar years. On April 14, 2000, Hillside filed a 
Counterclaim seeking an order of restitution of the leasehold premises in favor of Hillside, 
as well as treble damages for Rite Aid's unlawful detainer. 
On June 9, 2000, Hillside filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asking the lower 
court to dismiss Rite Aid's Complaint as a matter of law, and granting Hillside judgment on 
its Counterclaim. On June 29, 2000, Rite Aid filed a Cross-motion for Summary Judgment. 
In July, 2000, both parties filed Notices to Submit for Decision on their respective motions. 
Disposition in the Trial Court. Neither party requested oral argument on its 
motion, and the lower court decided those motions on submission. On August 4, 2000, the 
lower court entered two Minute Entries without any comment or reasoning, and merely 
indicated the Court's decision by way of check marks: granting Rite Aid's Cross-motion for 
Summary Judgment and denying Hillside's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On August 28, 2000, Rite Aid submitted a proposed Order and Summary Judgment 
to the lower court. Rite Aid did not submit an affidavit of attorneys fees and costs prior to 
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that date, but merely included such fees and costs as part of its proposed Summary7 Judgment. 
On September 6, 2000, Hillside filed an Objection to Rite Aid's proposed Order and 
Summary Judgment, arguing that those documents imported and incorporated new material 
and issues never adduced prior to the lower court's ruling, and to which Hillside had 
inadequate opportunity to respond. Among such items were: (1) Rite Aid's claim for and 
calculation of prejudgment interest, particularly where such interest was charged on 
gratuitous and mistaken overpayments on Rite Aid's part, and for time periods during which 
Hillside either had no knowledge of nor control over certain of the overpayments at issue; 
and (2) Rite Aid's inclusion of attorneys fees where the case involved the parties' conflicting 
but good-faith and reasonable interpretations of arguably ambiguous contractual provisions 
rather than a clear and knowing breach of the same. On September 21, 2000, the lower court 
again entered a Minute Entry devoid of any comment or explanatory reasoning, and merely 
indicated by check mark that Hillside's Objection to Rite Aid's proposed Order and 
Summary Judgment was denied. Rite Aid's proposed Order and Summary Judgment were 
signed on September 21, 2000, and Summary Judgment was entered in the registry of 
judgments on September 27, 2000. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about May 6, 1974, the parties' respective predecessors-in-interest 
entered into a lease agreement for certain commercial leasehold property. (R. at 9-29.) 
2. A material provision of the parties' lease agreement required the tenant to 
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provide the landlord a statement of gross sales derived from the leasehold premises during 
a given calendar year as well as pay that given calendar year's percentage rent (as determined 
by gross sales and in addition to monthly rental payments) on or before March 1 of the 
following calendar year. (R. at 9-11.) 
3. Another provision of the parties' lease agreement required the landlord to pay 
taxes levied against the leasehold premises and further required the tenant to reimburse the 
landlord for such taxes paid, but further provided that "[a]ll amounts paid by tenants 
pursuant to this article, may be deducted by Tenant from any percentage rent due for the 
calendar year in which such taxes werepaid[.]" (R. at 11; emphasis added.) 
4. On April 19,1999, Rite Aid corresponded with Hillside, asserting that Rite Aid 
had not offset tax reimbursement payments against applicable percentage rent for the years 
calendar 1994, 1995, and 1996, and demanded repayment from Hillside of an amount equal 
to the offsets Rite Aid had earlier failed to claim. (R. at 87.) 
5. Rite Aid had failed to make any claims for percentage rent overpayments 
allegedly occurring in calendar years 1994,1995 or 1996 until calendar year 1999. (R. at 74, 
105 and 123.) 
6. On May 20, 1999, Hillside responded to Rite Aid's demand by: (1) asserting 
that Rite Aid had waived its right to offsets for any particular calendar year when Rite Aid 
proceeded to make percentage rental payments without invoking its option as to such offsets; 
(2) asserting that Rite Aid had inappropriately offset tax reimbursement payments made in 
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calendar year 1998 for percentage rent accrued in calendar year 1997; and (3) demanding 
payment of the 1997 percentage rent inappropriately offset and not paid by Rite Aid. (R. at 
89-91.) 
7. On June 21,1999, Rite Aid responded by announcing that it would deduct from 
future rental payments amounts that it claimed it had failed to offset for calendar years 1994, 
1995 and 1996. (R.at93.) 
8. Pursuant to Rite Aid's announced intent, Rite Aid proceeded to deduct 
$5,000.00 from each of its monthly rental payments made in the months of July, August and 
September of calendar year 1999. (R. at 75, 106 and 123.) 
9. On September 17, 1999, Hillside, through its counsel, served Rite Aid with 
" 15-Day Notice of Monetary Default," demanding the $15,000.00 deducted from 1999 
monthly rental payments in addition to the 1997 percentage rent payment Rite Aid had failed 
to pay. (R. at 95-96.) 
10. On September 28, 1999, Rite Aid made payment of the $15,000.00 under 
protest. (R. at 98.) 
11. Hillside paid the 1999 property taxes assessable against the leasehold premises 
at or about the time such taxes were due. (R. at 75, 106 and 124.) 
12. Rite Aid drafted a check for reimbursement to Hillside of 1999 calendar year 
property taxes in the amount of $17,000.14, but did not send such payment until at least 
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January 3, 2000, the actual date postmarked on the envelope containing the reimbursement 
payment mailed to Hillside. (R. at 76, 106 and 124.) 
13. Rite Aid's 1999 tax reimbursement in the amount of $17,000.14 was not paid 
in the 1999 calendar year, but in the 2000 calendar year, since Rite Aid retained possession 
of the check until at least January 3, 2000. (R. at 76, 107 and 124.) 
14. On January 26, 2000, Rite Aid provided Hillside a financial report for the 
calendar year 1999 whereby it attempted to offset its 1999 tax reimbursement made in 
calendar year 2000 ($17,000.14) against its percentage rent due for 1999 ($7,320.48), thereby 
attempting to eliminate its 1999 percentage rent payment. (R. at 76, 107 and 124) 
15. On February 17,2000, Hillside sent correspondence to Rite Aid informing Rite 
Aid that its attempted offset of tax reimbursements made in calendar year 2000 against 
percentage rent due for calendar year 1999 was inappropriate, asked Rite Aid to correct this 
error, and requested payment of the calendar year 1999 percentage rent on or before March 
1, 2000 per the terms of the lease agreement. (R. at 46.) 
16. Rite Aid failed to pay the percentage rent due for 1999 on or before March 1, 
2000, as requested by Hillside. (R. at 76, 107 and 124.) 
17. On March 14,2000, Hillside, through its counsel, gave Rite Aid formal written 
notice, pursuant to the parties' lease agreement, of Rite Aid's opportunity to cure its failure 
to pay the percentage rent due for calendar year 1999 within fifteen days. (R. at 44-45.) 
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18. Rite Aid failed to cure its previous failure to pay the percentage rent due for 
calendar year 1999 within fifteen days of receiving Hillside's fifteen-day notice to cure. (R. 
at 77, 107 and 124.) 
19. On April 6,2000, Hillside served Rite Aid's manager at the leasehold premises 
in question a three-day notice to pay rent or vacate the leasehold premises. (R. at 102-03.) 
20. Rite Aid failed to either pay its rent or vacate the leasehold premises within 
three days of receiving Hillside's three-day notice to pay rent or vacate. (R. at 77, 108 and 
124.) 
21. To date, Rite Aid has failed to vacate the leasehold premises and continues to 
occupy the same. (R. at 77, 108 and 124.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Rite Aid could only offset tax reimbursements paid in any given calendar year against 
percentage rental payments accruing in the same calendar year, and the lower court erred in 
finding otherwise. Any tax reimbursement offsets that were not claimed within the year of 
actual percentage rental payment were waived, and Rite Aid's failure to claim offsets until 
three to five years after the fact acted as an implied waiver, and the lower court erred as a 
matter of law in finding otherwise. Because Rite Aid failed to pay certain amounts due and 
owing under the parties' lease agreement, and despite Hillside's notice of and demand for 
payment of the same, Rite Aid became in default of the lease as a matter of law, and became 
in unlawful detainer of the leasehold premises, and the lower court erred in failing to so hold. 
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The lower court erred in awarding attorneys fees where there was no material breach of the 
parties' lease agreement on Hillside's part, and where an affidavit of attorneys fees was never 
submitted as required by the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The lower court erred 
in awarding prejudgment interest where such interest was derivative of overpayments for 
time periods where Hillside had no such knowledge of such putative overpayments and 
where Rite Aid unilaterally offset rental payments against such alleged overpayments thereby 
depriving Hillside of control over such monies. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BY THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT, RITE AID COULD NOT OFFSET 
PROPERTY TAX REIMBURSEMENTS MADE IN ONE CALENDAR YEAR 
AGAINST PERCENTAGE RENTAL PAYMENTS ACCRUING IN A 
DIFFERENT CALENDAR YEAR. 
Section 4 of the parties' Lease Agreement provides in pertinent part that Rite Aid, at 
its option, may deduct its tax reimbursement payments made to Hillside from any percentage 
rent otherwise due to Hillside and "due for the calendar year in which such taxes were paid": 
Landlord shall pay or cause to be paid all taxes levied against the Shopping 
Center, including general property taxes and special improvement taxes or 
assessments^]... Tenant agrees to reimburse Landlord for the amount of such 
taxes assessed against the Premises during the original term of this Lease [.] 
. . . Tenant shall also reimburse Landlord for its pro rata share of the general 
property taxes assessed against the Common Areas Tenant shall reimburse 
Landlord for its share of such general property taxes within 30 days after 
receipt by Tenant of a statement setting forth the amount due Landlord under 
the provisions of this article, together with the original tax bill or a true copy 
thereof and a computation of the amount to be paid by Tenant, determined as 
provided in this article. All amounts paid by Tenant pursuant to this article, 
may be deducted by Tenant from any percentage rent due for the calendar 
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year in which such taxes were paid, regardless of who may own Landlord's 
interest in this Lease at the time. 
(R. at 11; emphasis added.) The language of this provision is clear and unambiguous on its 
face: Rite Aid has the option of deducting tax reimbursement payments from percentage rent 
due in the same calendar year in which Rite Aid made such tax reimbursement payments. 
Conversely, Rite Aid—as a matter of plain contractual interpretation—cannot offset its tax 
payments made in one calendar year against percentage rental accruing in a different 
calendar year, nor does it have the discretion to do so. 
It is undisputed that Rite Aid did not make its tax reimbursement payment for 1999 
property taxes until the calendar year 2000. Therefore, Rite Aid was free to offset its 
payment made in calendar year 2000 against percentage rentals that accrued in calendar year 
2000. However, as a matter of clear contractual interpretation, it cannot offset its tax 
reimbursement payment made in calendar year 2000 against percentage rental liabilities 
accruing in any other calendar year either prior or subsequent to calendar year 2000. 
Therefore, Rite Aid's first cause of action, asking that its calendar year 2000 tax 
reimbursement payment be offset against its percentage rent accrued for calendar year 1999, 
should have been disallowed, and the lower court erred as a matter of law in granting Rite 
Aid summary judgment on this cause of action. 
Likewise, the same reasoning applies for the "overpayment" Rite Aid sought for the 
calendar year 1997 in its second cause of action. Rite Aid attempted to offset tax 
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reimbursements made in calendar 1998 against percentage rent accrued in calendar year 
1997. As demonstrated above, the clear terms of the parties' lease agreement do not allow 
this. Rite Aid had no cognizable basis upon which to demand return of this alleged 
"overpayment" for the same reasons that it should have been disallowed from making the 
offset it claimed in its first cause of action. Accordingly, that portion of Rite Aid's second 
cause of action that related to alleged overpayments for calendar 1997 should have been 
disallowed, and the lower court again erred as a matter of law in granting Rite Aid summary 
judgment on this portion of its second cause of action. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the parties' lease agreement requires Rite Aid to 
make its tax reimbursement payments within thirty days of notice. Rite Aid was well aware 
of Hillside's obligation to pay property taxes by November 30 of each year and of Rite Aid's 
consequent obligation to reimburse Hillside within thirty days, and therefore could not, and 
did not, claim surprise, excusable neglect, or any identifiable action on the part of Hillside 
as the reason for its otherwise unexplained failure to make reimbursement payments before 
the end of the calendar year. 
At the lower court below, Rite Aid argued that as long as Hillside made a timely 
property tax payment, Rite Aid was thereby free to offset its reimbursement payments against 
subsequent years' percentage rents, and that the timeliness requirement in the lease 
agreement applied to Hillside, not Rite Aid. In other words, Rite Aid argued for turning the 
lease agreement on its head by hinging Rite Aid's ability to offset tax reimbursements against 
13 
percentage rent upon the timeliness of Hillside's property tax payments to Salt Lake County, 
not the timeliness of Rite Aid's reimbursements to Hillside. Such a counter-intuitive 
interpretation not only enables Rite Aid to escape any practical limitations on offset due to 
Rite Aid's own dilatory behavior, but in fact constructs an offset mechanism that is open-
ended and subject to no practical time limitations whatsoever. As long as Hillside (and not 
Rite Aid) makes a timely payment of property taxes to the county, Rite Aid is thereby free 
to make its reimbursement in the next calendar year, or even later if it so chooses, and then 
at some unspecified time in the future (perhaps even six years later), claim an offset (or some 
cumulative number of them) based on the fortuitous fact that Hillside (not Rite Aid) paid 
"such taxes" during the relevant year(s). That clearly would be a one-sided arrangement 
whereby: (1) Hillside has a two-fold burden of making timely tax payments every year, and 
having to be prepared at any moment's notice at some time in the indeterminate future to 
honor Rite Aid's demand for unexercised and perhaps cumulative offsets; and (2) Rite Aid 
enjoys the windfall of making its tax reimbursement payment to Hillside in a generally 
untimely fashion or whenever Rite Aid may see fit, being under no compulsion to exercise 
its offsets in a timely manner or even for years, and enjoying an open-ended opportunity to 
exercise and enforce such offsets at any undetermined time in the future. Such an 
arrangement would rightly be held illusory, since Rite Aid is in sole control of the conditions 
precedent under which it will perform, while at the same time claiming an absolute right to 
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compel Hillside's performance. (This is in fact what Rite Aid is doing with its claims for 
unrealized offsets for calendar years 1994 through 1996.) 
Rite Aid's strained interpretation of lease requirements and the resultant open-ended 
enforceability of the parties' offset provision would render the parties' relationship largely 
unworkable due to the uncertainty and ambiguity Rite Aid's interpretation would introduce 
into the parties' relationship. It is a basic tenet of contract interpretation that an interpretation 
rendering a contract definite, enforceable and workable should be favored over one that 
renders the contract ambiguous, unworkable and illusory. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Stewart. 291 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1955). 
II. RITE AID WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO OFFSET FOR GIVEN CALENDAR 
YEARS WHEN IT FAILED TO EXERCISE SUCH RIGHT WITHIN THOSE 
CALENDAR YEARS, AND IT CANNOT DEMAND THEM SEVERAL YEARS 
AFTER THE FACT IN A CUMULATIVE FASHION. 
In calendar year 1999, Rite Aid: (1) asserted for the first time that it overpaid its 
percentage rents for each of the calendar years 1994 through 1996; and (2) demanded, also 
for the first time, a reimbursement for amounts allegedly overpaid during those years. Rite 
Aid's claimed "overpayments" arise from tax reimbursement offsets it failed to make or 
assert against percentage rent payments during the calendar years in question. 
As such, Rite Aid was unable to make a reimbursement demand in 1999, or now, for 
the basic reason that it has waived its opportunity to demand reimbursement for the years in 
question. A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. K & T. Inc. v. 
15 
Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994). In Utah, %*waiver requires three elements: (1) an 
existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to 
relinquish the right." Id at 628-29. "The intention to relinquish the right may be either 
expressed or implied and may be implied from action or inaction" (emphasis added). Id at 
629. Inaction can lead to waiver where its effect is to lead a party to conclude that the 
inactive party is not claiming the right, benefit, or advantage which otherwise may be due 
it: 
Under the doctrine of waiver, the unexpressed, subjective reasons for the 
relinquishment of a right are largely irrelevant. The question whether waiver 
will be found in any particular case depends not upon the secret intention of 
the party against whom it is asserted, but upon the effect which his conduct has 
had upon the other party. Stated another way, one cannot prevent a waiver by 
a private mental reservation contrary to an intent to waive, where his or her 
actions clearly indicate such an intent. 
B.R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. v. Collins Food Service, Inc.. 754 P.2d 99, 103 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (food distributor failing to demand 
monthly incentive commissions over one-year time period where otherwise provided by 
contract deemed to have waived right to those commissions for months in question). While 
waiver is obviously more clear and distinct where there is an express relinquishment, it can 
also be implied from conduct or silence when "there is some duty or obligation to speak." 
Soter's v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan, 857 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993). 
In the present instance, all three elements of waiver are satisfied. First, Paragraph 4 
of the parties' lease agreement allows Rite Aid to offset a given year's tax reimbursement 
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payments against the same year's accrued percentage rent, albeit on Rite Aid's initiative. 
Second, a party to a contract is deemed to know and be aware of the provisions of that 
contract. Third, Rite Aid's inaction for a three- to five-year period in failing to assert 
presumptively known contractual rights is just the type of inaction that reasonably led 
Hillside to conclude that Rite Aid was not invoking the offset for the calendar years in 
question, and to make business decisions and expenditures accordingly. 
Once percentage rent for a given calendar year has accrued and is identifiable, Rite 
Aid has until March 1 of the following calendar year in which to pay such an amount. (See 
R. at 9-11.) Conversely, any tax reimbursement offset allocable to the same calendar year 
and that could have been asserted prior to or at the time of payment of percentage rent is 
waived if not made at the time of payment. In other words, offsets not claimed within the 
contractual time of payment are waived. This is evidenced by: (1) the discretionary language 
of the parties' lease agreement allowing offsets at the tenant's initiative and discretion;1 in 
tandem with (2) the mandatory language requiring percentage rent to be paid before a date 
certain.2 
1
 Section 4 of the Lease Agreement reads in pertinent part: "All amounts paid 
by Tenant pursuant to this article, may be deducted by Tenant from any percentage rent due 
for the calendar year in which such taxes were paid" (R. at 11; emphasis added). 
2
 Section 3 of the Lease Agreement reads in pertinent part: "Payment of such 
percentage rent, if any, shall bt made on or before March 1st of each year for the preceding 
calendar year" (R. at 9; emphasis added). 
17 
Furthermore, waiver can be implied from Rite Aid's silence as well as its inaction. 
Rite Aid maintained an absolute silence for three to five years as to offsets for which Rite 
Aid was otherwise allowed to make an election, but for which it failed to do so in even a 
reasonably timely manner. As pointed out above, under the parties' lease agreement. Rite 
Aid was required to generate and submit a percentage rent report, as well as pay its 
percentage rent for a given calendar year, by March 1 of the following calendar year. 
Applicable offsets should be reported in the percentage rent report submitted for a given 
year. Hillside is entitled to rely on the accuracy of such reports, and has in fact relied on the 
accuracy of such reports in making certain business decisions and making certain 
expenditures. At no time did Hillside contemplate or expect that the reports would not reflect 
material claims, such as offset, or that such material modifications for claims that could have 
and should have been made in the original report could retroactively (and cumulatively) be 
made at any time in the indeterminate future after the calendar year in question. If Rite Aid's 
silence as to its purported offsets under these circumstances did not constitute a waiver, then 
Rite Aid could fail to request offsets for an indeterminate number of years, either 
sporadically or cumulatively, and only after the end of such indeterminate period demand a 
refund of all offsets in one lump sum. This would convert Rite Aid's offsets into open-ended 
and retroactive options of unlimited duration, and make Hillside's business planning and 
capital expenditures uncertain and problematic. 
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In other words, this situation is analogous to an optionee^ opportunity to exercise an 
option by a contractually-specified deadline. An optionee is free to exercise or not exercise 
his option within the specified time period. If he does so, his exercise will be honored 
pursuant to the terms of the option agreement. If he fails to do so, or attempts to do so 
beyond the specified deadline, he cannot then compel recognition of his exercise since he has 
already lost his opportunity for exercise, i.e., the failure to exercise an available option is the 
loss of an opportunity, not the loss of a contractual right.3 Another appropriate analogy is 
that of the store coupon. Failure to redeem the coupon by its stated expiration date renders 
the coupon useless, because the opportunity for redemption has passed. Here, where Rite 
Aid has not exercised its opportunity for offset by the mandatory payment date, it has waived 
such offset for the applicable calendar year. 
On a less theoretical and more practical level, Rite Aid's demand for retroactive and 
cumulative offsets is inconsistent with efficient or rational business practice. When an offset 
is not requested prior to or concurrent with payment, and indeed is not even mentioned at the 
time of payment, it is reasonable for the payee to assume that any such potential request has 
been waived, particularly when such a request is wholly at the discretion of the payor but has 
not otherwise been invoked or referenced by the payor. However, Rite Aid's position is that 
3
 Again, the permissive nature of the operative contractual language indicates 
that an timely opportunity, not a retroactive right, is involved: "All amounts paid by Tenant 
pursuant to this article, may be deducted by Tenant from any percentage rent due for the 
calendar year in which such taxes were paid" (R. at 11; emphasis added.) 
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a payee in Hillside's position should always have the cloud of unresolved offsets hovering 
over it for an indeterminate amount of time into the future. Utah courts have recognized this 
practical limitation by identifying inaction as a cognizable form of waiver where that 
inaction leads a party to believe that the inactive party has chosen not to exercise its rights 
or benefits, and the relying party then acts accordingly. In other words, inaction is to be 
judged by an objective, not subjective, standard. 
In short, Rite Aid's waiver can be implied from Rite Aid's failure to invoke the 
discretionary offset clause contained in the parties' lease agreement, as well as from a totality 
of the circumstances, particularly where: (1) Rite Aid, as party to that agreement, is deemed 
to be cognizant of such terms and cannot excuse its inaction solely on the bases of mistake 
or inattention in relation to the lease agreement; and (2) where such discretionary offsets, 
from the face of the parties' lease agreement and the totality of the circumstances, were 
clearly anticipated to be exercised on a yearly basis rather than an open-ended basis of 
unlimited duration. In the totality of the circumstances, it was Rite Aid's three- to five-year 
inaction and/or silence in failing to assert presumptively known contractual rights that 
reasonably led Hillside to conclude that Rite Aid was not invoking the offset for the calendar 
years in question, and to make certain business decisions and capital expenditures 
accordingly. Because no material facts were in dispute in the proceedings below, but only 
the purported effects of those undisputed facts, the lower court should have made a 
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determination of waiver from the totality of the circumstances of this case as presented in the 
parties' undisputed facts, and erred in not doing so. 
III. RITE AID WAS IN DEFAULT OF THE PARTIES' LEASE AGREEMENT, 
AND WAS IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER AFTER ITS REFUSAL TO TIMELY 
RESPOND TO HILLSIDE'S RIGHTFUL PAYMENT DEMANDS. 
As discussed above, by the clear and unambiguous terms of the parties' lease 
agreement, Rite Aid: (1) was unable to offset tax reimbursements paid in the 2000 calendar 
year against its 1999 percentage rent payment due and owing on March 1, 2000; and thereby 
(2) violated the material terms of the lease agreement in refusing to pay the percentage rent 
payment due and owing on March 1, 2000. Furthermore, Rite Aid's refusal to pay 
percentage rent due and owing Hillside, in contravention of the parties' lease agreement and 
Hillside's rightful demands, constituted a material breach of the parties' lease agreement. 
Therefore, Hillside was statutorily entitled to make demand on Rite Aid that it either pay rent 
due and owing or vacate the leasehold premises. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-36-3(l)(c) and 
78-36-6. It was undisputed below that Hillside did make such demand, and it was also 
undisputed below that Rite Aid refused to either pay rent or vacate, and that it continued to 
occupy the premises. As such, Rite Aid as a matter of law was (and is) in unlawful detainer 
of the premises. Therefore, Hillside was statutorily entitled to a judgment awarding it 
restitution of the premises, treble damages, and attorneys fees (see Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-
10), and the lower court erred in refusing to grant Hillside such relief as a matter of law. 
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IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
COSTS TO RITE AID. 
The lower court's Minute Entry granting Rite Aid summary judgment was silent on 
the issue of attorneys fees. Rite Aid imported an award of attorneys fees into its proposed 
Summary Judgment, and the lower court incorporated such additional terms over Hillside's 
objections. 
Yet the fact remains, Hillside did not breach the parties' lease agreement. Though 
Rite Aid ultimately prevailed below on the issue of contract interpretation, the conflict was 
one almost wholly of Rite Aid's own making. Not only did Rite Aid make the gratuitous and 
mistaken overpayments leading to the dispute, but it (through its predecessor-in-interest) also 
drafted the ambiguous contractual provision upon which this case was ultimately decided.4 
Had Hillside clearly, intentionally, or in bad faith breached the parties' contract, then an 
award of attorneys fees would clearly be warranted. However, where Hillside makes a good-
faith argument based on its reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous contractual provision 
4
 The parties' leasehold agreement states: "This Lease, although drafted by 
Tenant, shall be interpreted and construed only by the contents hereof and there shall be no 
presumption or standard of construction in favor of or against either Landlord or Tenant." 
(R. at 26.) The clear import of this passage is Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest's 
acknowledgment of draftsmanship. Of lesser import is its attempt to waive the established 
legal presumption that in cases of ambiguity, a contract is interpreted against its drafter. 
Jones. Waldo. Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson. 923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah 1996) 
(general rule of contract interpretation that ambiguous language is to be construed against 
the drafter). Hillside has been unable to find authority for the proposition that a drafting 
party can waive the presumption of construing ambiguities against the drafter, and would 
therefore argue that Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest is not free to waive such a legal 
presumption, particularly in such a self-serving manner. 
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drafted by Rite Aid and in response to a situation that was created by Rite Aid's own careless 
behavior, attorneys fees would be inappropriate, if not punitive. The lower court erred in 
awarding attorneys fees. 
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
COSTS WHERE THE SAME WERE NEVER SUBMITTED BY WAY OF 
AFFIDAVIT PRIOR TO ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. 
Rule 4-505 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration states in pertinent part: 
Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be filed with the court 
and set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work 
performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim 
to judgment... and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal 
services. 
(Emphasis added). In other words, an attorneys fees affidavit compliant with the terms of 
Rule 4-505 is a mandatory prerequisite to any award of attorneys fees. 
The lower court issued its Minute Entries on summary judgment, without comment 
or mention of attorneys fees, on August 4,2000. Rite Aid was directed, by means of a check 
mark, to prepare an order. At no time prior to August 28, 2000 did Rite Aid ever submit an 
affidavit of attorneys fees and costs as required by Rule 4-505. On August 28, 2000, Rite 
Aid submitted its proposed Order and Summary Judgment. Paragraph 4 of the proposed 
Summary Judgment read: "Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant for its attorney 
fees and costs in the amount of $5,040.00." No legal basis for such an award was identified, 
nor was the nature of the work, time spent, or reasonableness of rates identified. Hillside 
objected on the bases that the proposed Summary Judgment: (1) was untimely (outside of the 
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fifteen days mandated by Rule 4-505(1)); and (2) that by importing several terms never 
addressed in arguments for summary judgment or by the lower court's Minute Entries (such 
as attorneys fees and several items of interest), the proposed Summary Judgment did not 
conform with the lower court's ruling. Hillside submitted its own proposed Summary 
Judgment in conformance with the lower court's ruling, and in the alternative, asked the 
lower court for a clarification of whether Rite Aid was in fact entitled to attorneys fees. 
The lower court responded by denying Hillside's objections and requests, and 
accepting Rite Aid's conclusory statement of attorneys fees, again without comment and by 
way of a lone check mark. As such, Hillside has never had an opportunity to understand, 
review or object to the legal basis, nature of work, or reasonableness of such attorneys fees. 
The lower court erred in awarding attorneys fees without any corresponding affidavit, and 
the error, depriving Hillside of any such of fee-related review and meaningful objection, is 
not harmless. 
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING SEVERAL ITEMS OF 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
Similar to the issue of attorneys fees, Rite Aid took advantage of the lower court's no-
comment Minute Entries to import awards of prejudgment interest into its proposed 
Summary Judgment that were never argued or presented to the lower court up to that point. 
Rite Aid justified the importation and scope of such items on the basis that since the lower 
court's Minute Entries lacked any comment on the reasons for granting Rite Aid's summary 
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judgment, that "Rite Aid accordingly inferred that the Court accepted Plaintiffs arguments." 
(R. At 241.) However, Rite Aid then proceeded to go far beyond mere inference, and argued 
that the lower court should retroactively accept and rule on issues never made nor adduced 
prior to the court's issuance of its no-comment Minute Entries, and to which Hillside had no 
opportunity to respond or dispute prior to the lower court's ruling. 
Rite Aid never provided to Hillside or the lower court a prejudgment interest figure 
on which it sought judgment at any time prior to the lower court's ruling. It did not provide 
such a figure nor its underlying calculations in either its pleadings or arguments on summary 
judgment. Instead, it belatedly presented such figures for the first time as a conclusory 
paragraph in its proposed Summary Judgment. Rite Aid's retroactive incorporation of such 
a "stealth" figure into a court ruling that never considered nor ruled on such a figure, and the 
lower court's acceptance of the same despite Hillside's objections, is objectionable error for 
several fundamental reasons. 
First, as pointed out above, the interest figure and underlying calculations were never 
presented to the lower court or Hillside prior to their conclusory presentation in the proposed 
Summary Judgment. They were not introduced by way of affidavit, either pre- or post-
ruling, but were asserted for the first time in conclusory fashion in Rite Aid's post-ruling 
response. As such, Hillside had little to no opportunity to object to the accuracy of such non-
identified figures, their underlying calculations, or any of their underlying basic assumptions 
such as whether prejudgment interest is even available in this scenario or the correct time or 
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times when prejudgment interest should begin to accrue, if at all. Hillside was unable to 
argue or dispute such points for the simple fact that Rite Aid at no time adduced or argued 
them to the lower court prior to the lower court's ruling. 
Second, Rite Aid and the lower court failed to cite any persuasive authority that would 
allow prejudgment interest in this fact scenario involving an allegedly mistaken and 
gratuitous overpayment. Rite Aid itself states that "prejudgment interest in Utah represents 
an amount awarded as damages due to the defendants' delay in tendering an amount clearly 
owing under an agreement or other obligation." (R. at 246; internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted.) Here, the amounts at issue were not amounts that Hillside failed to pay 
to Rite Aid pursuant to an identified time schedule or contractual obligation, but were instead 
gratuitous and mistaken overpayments on the part of Rite Aid. Such overpayments were not 
demanded by Hillside, Hillside did not accept them with knowledge that they were 
mistakenly made, and Hillside was not aware until after April 1999 that Rite Aid believed 
the payments were mistakenly made. Rite Aid argued, and the lower court accepted, a novel 
and hitherto unaccepted legal theory that a party who ignorantly receives a gratuitous and 
mistaken payment should be penalized for such unwitting acceptance of mistaken funds, 
above and beyond merely repaying such funds. (Or to put it another way, Rite Aid converted 
its mistaken overpayments into an involuntary loan agreement for which Hillside must pay 
interest.) Hillside is unaware of any jurisdiction or commentator accepting this view, and 
Rite Aid cited no case law supportive of such a view. As between the party mistakenly 
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making the unnecessary payment and the ignorant party receiving it in good faith, equity 
would require that the mistaken party bear the loss of opportunity cost on the funds at issue. 
To put it more simply, as between two supposedly sophisticated business entities, the burden 
of loss should be placed on the entity engaging in careless business and accounting practices. 
Rite Aid argued, and the lower court accepted, that parties making business and accounting 
errors should be protected from any adverse effect of such self-inflicted errors (and in effect 
be relieved from any duty to mitigate damages), and that the financial cost of such errors 
should instead be shifted onto other commercial parties otherwise dealing with the mistaken 
parties in good faith. From a policy standpoint, widespread adoption of Rite Aid's novel no-
fault standard would only undermine confidence in business transactions as well as the legal 
system at large. 
Third, assuming for purposes of argument only that Rite Aid was entitled to any 
amount of prejudgment interest in this particular fact scenario (which issue was never argued 
before the lower court), such prejudgment interest could only begin to accrue at the very 
earliest from April 1999, the date that Rite Aid first apprised Hillside of the allegedly 
mistaken and gratuitous nature of Rite Aid's overpayments. To suggest any earlier accrual 
date is to put into effect a punitive standard neither recognized at law nor in business, as 
discussed above. It leads to the absurd result that the longer a mistakenly overpaying payor 
takes in apprising an ignorant payee of the payor's mistake, the more the payor can collect 
in interest charges at no ultimate cost to himself, the cost being borne entirely by the payee. 
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The payee thus becomes the payor's own unwitting depository and guarantor of a 10% 
interest rate, with accrued interest coming directly out of the payee's pocket on no other basis 
than the payor's dilatoriness and negligence, whether intentional or not. Again, such a 
standard that encourages, if not rewards, dilatory behavior, while at the same time 
discouraging timely revelation and resolution of mistaken overpayments, can only undermine 
confidence in business transactions as well as the legal system at large. 
Fourth, even assuming that prejudgment interest could or should accrue from April 
1999, Rite Aid and the lower court failed to account for the fact that the circumstances 
justifying prejudgment interest did not apply for a significant amount of time between April 
1999 and the lower court's ruling. Rite Aid's rationale for claiming prejudgment interest was 
its assertion that "Hillside had the benefit of Rite Aid's money" for the period that Hillside 
unwittingly received and held Rite Aid's allegedly mistaken and gratuitous overpayments. 
(R. at 245.) However, at such time as Rite Aid offset such alleged overpayments against 
rental payments otherwise due and owing Hillside, Hillside no longer "had the benefit" of 
such alleged overpayments, at least in such amounts and for such length of time as Rite Aid 
stopped making rental payments otherwise due and owing Hillside. So calculating 
prejudgment interest is not so simple a matter as applying a 10% rate from April 1999 to the 
present; it must also take into account and accordingly discount those amounts and periods 
of time subsequent to April 1999 when Rite Aid, not Hillside, had the effective benefit of 
such alleged overpayments. Rite Aid never established that amount at the lower court level. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the lower court's Minute Entries should be reversed, and 
this case remanded for a decision consistent with this Court's determination. Likewise, the 
lower court's award of attorneys fees and prejudgment interest should be vacated as improper 
and without legal basis. 
DATED this £)^_ day of March, 2001. 
KESLER & RUST 
Sc/ottXJ. Mercer 
AttorneVs for Appellant 
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HILLSIDE PLAZA LTD.? d/b/a : 
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: Case No. 000902699 
Defendants. : Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
The Court, having granted Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. The Court declares that Plaintiff is not in default under the lease with respect to 1999 
percentage rents and that Plaintiff appropriately deducted the tax reimbursement 
payment it made to Defendant from its 1999 percentage rents; 
F
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2. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant in the amounts of $5,550.07 for 
1994 percentage rents, $5,500 for 1995 percentage rents, $8,259 for 1996 percentage 
rents and $7,702.82 for 1997 percentage rents for a total of $27,011.89; 
3. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant for pre-judgment interest calculated 
from March 1 of the year following each year for which percentage rent was 
calculated (e.g.,March 1, 1995, for the 1994 percentage rent) through August 31, 
2000, in the following amounts: $3,052.50 for the 1994 percentage rent, $2,474.99 
for the 1995 percentage rents, $2,890.65 for the 1996 percentage rents and $1,925.70 
for the 1997 percentage rents, for a total award of pre-judgment interest in the 
amount of $10,343.84; 
4. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant for its attorneys fees and costs in the 
amount of $5,040.00; and 
5. Plaintiff is awarded post-judgment interest at the rate of 7.67% on the total judgment 
of $42,395.73 from the date this judgment is entered until it is paid. 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
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mail, postage pre-paid: 
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KESLER&RUST 
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ORDERS that Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied and Plaintiffs motion 
for summary judgment is granted for the reasons set forth in Plaintiffs memoranda supporting its 
motion and opposing Defendant's motion. 
DATED this L\day of3a}u&, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
KESLER & RUST 
Scott O. Mercer 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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the Utah Code of Jud. Admin., I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed 
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paid: 
Scott 0. Mercer 
Jason H. Robinson 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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LEASE AGREEMENT 
THIS LEASE AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of the 
day of May 5 . 1971, between HILLSIDE ?LA2A ASSOCIATES, 
a partnership. C"Landlord"J . and S K A C G S COMPANIES. INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, ("Tenant") , and is the lease agreement referred to in that certain 
lease of even date herewith between the parties hereto covering the premises 
(the "Premises") at 70th South and 23rd East, Salt La*e County. Utah, consisting 
of the outlined land area shaded in red and marked "Skaggs* an the plot plan 
attached to said lease as Exhibit "A* which is located in the shopping center, 
(the "Shopping Center'1) , the present boundaries of which arc described on 
Exhibit U3U attached to said l ease . This lease agreement is made to supplement 
and complete such lease and is to be deemed a material pare thereof for all 
purposes and to the same extent as i£ actually and fully set forth therein (such 
lease and this lease agreement being hereinafter collectively referred to as 
the "Lease-). 
(1) PRELIMINARY TERM RENT. No rent shall be due or payable 
during the preliminary term ex this Lease except such as may be due pursuant 
to the article entitled "COMMENCEMENT OF ORIGLNAL TERM." 
(2) ANNUAL RENT. Tenant agrees to pay Landlord during the 
original term a£ lliis Lc^ae *u <ga\uw*l re*U of Fifty-*Fuur Thousand Six Hundred 
Dollars ($54,600) in equal monthly installments of Four Thousand Five 
Hundred and Fifty Dollars (54,550) payable on or before the tenth day of each 
calendar month for the current calendar month. The annual rtm installment 
for any fractional calendar month at the beginning of the original term shall 
be prorated and paid on or before the tenth day of the calendar month following 
commencement of the original term. 
(3) PERCENTAGE RENT. On or before the first day of March 
following each calendar year of the original term of this Lease. Tenant agrees 
to mail or deliver to Landlord'a statement, signed by one of its officers, showing 
the actual sales (computed as hereinafter provided) made in or from the Premises 
during such year. 
Should said sales as so computed exceed the minimum sales base 
. of Three Million Sbc Hundred Forty Thousand Dollars ($3.64Q..0QQ) in any 
calendar year. Tenant agrees to pay Landlord as additional rem due hereunder 
a sum equal to one and one-half percent (1-1/2%) of such excess. Payment 
of such percentage rent , if any , shall be made on or before March 1st of each 
year for the preceding calendar year. 
In computing it3 saies for purposes of this article. Tenant shall 
include the total gross amount realized as the result af retail sales of merchandise 
and services rendered by Tenant and its successors, subsidiaries or affiliated 
corporations in or from the Premises , except that there shall not be Included 
in such computation the following: (I) the purchase price of all returned merchan-
dise which is refunded or credited to the purchaser; (2) all receipts (including 
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premiums. commissions and payments) .Vom lockers, weighing machines, 
stamp machines or other similar coin-operated devices. puolic telephones. 
pay toilets, travelers c h e c k s , money orders, easnmg and issuing of checks , 
payments of utility bi l ls or l ike services , postage stamps and licenses sold 
to the public: (3) sums or credits received in settlement at claims for loss 
or damage to merchandise : (4) all sales, use, excise, retailer's occupation 
or other similar t a x e s , whether now or hereafter imposed, and by whatever 
name, which arc based upon the gross receipts of Tenant or upon the sale 
or sales price of merchandise or services sold by Tenant and which must be 
paid by Tenant whether or not collected by Tenant from its customers; (5) 
the return or transfer ox" merchandise from the ?r*3\\scs ID other stores or 
warehouses of Tenant or i ts affiliated companies: (6) returns to vendors or 
suppliers; (7) c h a r g e s paid or payable by customers for mailing or delivery 
of merchandise; (8) s e r v i c e charges , interest u\d collection expenses rece ived 
or receivable from customers for sales on credit; (9) the purchase price of 
goods or services so ld to employees of Tenani; (10) the net amount of discounts 
allowed to any cus tomer , including hut not limited to, discounts allowed by 
way of or resulting from the issuance to customers of trading stamps or other 
evidences of purchase for immediate or future exchange tor merchandise or 
other things of value; (11) merchandise or other things of value issued by Tenant 
in redemption ox trading stamps or other evidences of value or issued by Tenant 
as a premium or o therwise in connection with any sales promotion program 
of Tenant; and (12) sa l e s ax a discount to memebers of the medical profess ion. 
Sales of merchandise or services by concessionaires shall not 
be include:< in the compulation of sales upon which Tenant pays percentage 
rKit. bu* the nc: SLrnsur.t z£ commissions or similar payments received by Tenant 
from or on account of such concess ions shall be included in such computation 
of sales. Tenant a g r e e s that it will not permit the use of more than 2,800 s q u a r e 
feet of the Premises by any s u c h concessionaires. With respect to coin operated 
vending machines on the P r e m i s e s , only Tenant's share or participation in 
the gross revenue therefrom shall be included in such computation of s a l e s . 
For the so le p u r p o s e of ascertaining the amount of such sales* 
Tenant agrees that Landlord or Landlord's agents, at Landlord's expense^ 
may inspect any and all of Tenant's records of sales made in or from the Premises 
(including sales tax re turns and other reports or returns made to governmental 
authorities) at the d i s tr i c t office of Tenant or daily sales reports at the store 
on the Premises; p r o v i d e d „ any inspection made pursuant to wis paragraph 
must be made within two C2) years after the statement ox sales is mailed or 
delivered by Tenant to Landlord and any such inspection shall be limited u> 
the period covered by s u c h statement. Landlord agrees to hold in confidence 
all sales figures and other information obtained from Tenant's records. If such 
audit reveals that Tenant ' s s a l e s have been understated by more than three p e r -
cent (3%), Tenant shall pay all costs of the audit, in addition to additional rental 
due. 
Any claim by Landlord for revision of any statement of sales o r . 
for additional percentage r e n t , which claim is not made to Tenant within two 
(2) years after the date s u c h statement of sales is mailed or deliverecLto Landlord 
shall be deemed and h e r e b y i s waived by Landlord, 
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Tcnant makes no representation or warranty as to the sales it 
expec:$ lo make in or cram the Premises or that u wdl use the Premises for 
any particular purpose or at all. 
References in this Lease :o a proportionate reduction or abatement 
of rent shall not apply 10 percentage rent. 
(4) TAXES. Landlord shall pay or cause to be paid all taxes 
levied against the Shopping Center, including general property taxes and 
special improvement taxes or assessments, and shall indemnify Tenant and 
hold Tenant harmless from apy and all claims or demands for payment of any 
such taxes or a s s e s s m e n t s ^ r o v i d e d , Tenant shall pay all taxes levied on 
personal propercy and equipment owned by Tenant. 
Tenant agrees to reimburse Landlord for the amount of such" ) 
taxes assessed against ;hc Premises during the original term of rhis_ Lease 
(or as the same may be extenceo) . Taxes for any partial year at the commence-
ment of the term shall be prorated, Landlord shall endeavor to have the 
Premises and the improvements thereon separately assessed for general 
property taxes. Such separate assessment, if made, shall provide the basis 
for tax reimbursement. If ^uch taxes "are not separately assessed, the portion 
of such-taxes^xo^be reimbursed by Tenant shall be (i) with respect to taxes 
on the'land, that portion thereof which the ground floor square footage of 
the Premises bears to the square footage of the parcel for which the tax is 
assessed, and (ii) with respect to the improvements on the Premises, that 
portion thereof which the value of die building and other improvements on 
the Premises for property u x purposes beers cs the value c: all buildinjjs 
and other improvements on the parcel for whicn the tax is assessed. Tenant 
s a ail also reimburse Landlord for its pro rata share of the general property 
Faxes assess eg_agajngr ^g^Ccjnmon^Areas, T enantTs pro rata share shall 
be that portion thereof which the ground floor square footage of the Premises 
bears to the total ground floor square footage of all buildings in the Shopping 
Center. Tenant shall reimburse Landlord for its share of such general P^opcrty^ 
taxes within 30 days after receipt by Tenant of a statement setting forth the 
amount due Landlord under the provisions of this article, together with the 
original tax bill or a true copy thereof and a computation of the amount 
to be paid by Tenant, determined as provided in this article. All amounts 
paid by Tenant pursuant to this article, may be deducted by Tenant from any 
percentage rent due for the calendar year in which such taxes were paid, regard-
less of who may own Landlord's interest in this Lease at the nme. Tenant 
may, in its own name or in the name of Landlord, contest any such assess-
ment or tax but, in any such event» Landlord shall share in all costs and expenses 
of contesting such assessment or tax j ^ i t s jnceresi may appear. 
(5) COMMON AREAS AND PARKING. Landlord agrees to maintain 
the Common Arj^^^Iiaxiuding all common concourses and malls) in good repair, 
clean, safe , {OT*Sentabjc^yi ih all landscaped areas in a neat thriving condition, 
reasonably free from ice and snow, adequately lighted during all hours Tenant 
is normally open for business and with proper facilities for drainage ol surface 
water and to provide adequate security protection. The parking areas shall 
be maintained with adequate hard surfacing and proper directional signs and 
striping for standard sice American automobiles. 
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Tenant agrees to reimburse Landlord for Tcr.ant^share of 
the actual cost incurred by Landlord for the expenses gToceracion^main-
ter.ance, repair and replacement of the Common Areas as Hennaed above, 
far the premiums on liability insurance pertaining to the Cammon Areas which 
Landlord is required to maintain by the provisions of Liis Lease, for the actuai 
cast of depreciation and taxes on personal property (e .g . . parking lot sweeper, 
snow removal equipment) used exeiuYiveiy for the bene:;: ex the Common Areas 
and lor the cose at power used jo.jjphj-fche Common Areas (but without any C h{r< 
charge for deprep-'-r'nr'- af or taxes on the Common Areas, for the cost of (' 
capital improvements thereon, or tor management or clerical services of 
Landlord or its, agent) . Tenant's snare snail Dc 3 g'raction of such total cost, 
the numerator of which is the ground floor building area leased to Tenant 
and the denominator or" which is the total ground floor area of all buildingsC-/LC h±^Jj~ » ^ 
(excluding malls and sidewalks) in the Shopping Center and anv enlargement £U**uUj 2 
thereof ''including the area of the Premises). Tenant shall pay to Landlord 
the sum of S300 ser month as its estimated pro rata share of such costs, with 
the actual costs to be adjusted annually. Tenant mav examine the accounts 
^and original bills iav such costs at anv reasonable lime, 
Tenant may as any time and from time to time, upon at least sixty 
(60) days prior notice to Landlord, elect to assume Landlord's obligations to 
maintain and repair Tenant's portion of the Common Areas (which area is 
outlined and cross -hatched in orange on Exhibit "A-), except fcr repaving 
and other costs which cannot be practicably segregated or allocated to Tenant's 
portion c: the Oarsmen Arccs (which costs shall continue to be proportionately 
paid for by Tenant pursuant to the formula in the seconc paragraph 01 tins 
article). in the even: ox such assumption by Tenant. Tenant agrees to main-
tain and repair Tenant's portion of the Common Areas at its sole cost and ex-
pense, in a manner and ax a level of quality at least comparable to that of Land-
lord; provided, that any such assumption by Tenant shall not diminish Land-
lord's obligations or liability as set forth in the articles herein entitled •INDEM-
NIFICATION" and "LIABILITY INSURANCE.* Tenant may also elect to terminate 
its obligations to maintain and repair Tenant's portion of the Common Areas 
by giving at least sixty (60) days prior notice to Landlord, in which event 
Landlord agrees to resume its duties as outlined in the first paragraph of this 
article and Tenant agrees to pay for its pro rata share of such costs in accord 
with the second paragraph a: this article. 
If, without Tenant's prior written consent. 
(a) Access by Tenant, its invitees, customers and employees to 
the Shopping Center from adjacent streets or to and from the Premises 
within the Shopping Center is altered from that shown on Exhibit i A ." 
or 
yL (b) The Common Areas are, for any reason, diminished to less than, 
the vehicle parking and roadway ratio specified in this Lease, 
then and in any of such events, Tenant may. in addition to any other remedy 
provided by law or this Lease, terminate this Lease by giving notice thereof 
to Landlord, such termination to be effective 60 days after the date notice is 
given, it being understood and agreed that such access and Common Areas 
are essential to the use of the Premises by Tenant and is a fundamental provision 
of tnis Lease and that any deprivation, alteration or modification th^rrnf fan, 
anv-cause. regardless of Jaylt_by.Lanxllor.d^.is ^ufficient^cause for^uanUialtgO^ 
of ihU Lra*;* , .Rent shall be paid 10 the effective date of Termination And Tenant 
shall be entitled 10 a refund of any r*M paid for any period after said effective 
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Landlord agrees that employees o( Tenant shall be permitted to 
park their motor vehicles in the Shopping Center, in areas which shall be 
designated by Landlord at the request ot Tenant; provided, that eippioyees 
of Tenant and other tenants in the Shopping CtMtr shall not be permitted to 
park in front of the building leased to Tenant nor1 in any areas the use o£ which 
would unreasonably interfere with access to such building. Tenant agrees 
to require its employees to paxk their motor vehicles at the places so designated. 
No charge or other type of validation (or parking in the Shopping 
Center may be made to employees , invitees or customers of Tenant without 
the prior written consent of Tenant , unless mandatorily imposed by governmental 
authority. 
The Common Areas may be used to the extent necessary in the 
making of repairs and alterations to the buildings in the Shopping Center, 
provided that such use shal l not unreasonably interfere with the use of or 
access to the Premises by T e n a n t , its invitees, customers and employees. 
(6) LANDLORD'S TITLE. Landlord covenants that Landlord has 
good and marketable title to or a valid leasehold interest in the property included 
within the Shopping Center, with full right and authoriry to grant the estate 
demised herein and to execute and perform all of the terms and conditions 
of this Lease. 
Landlord agrees that Tenant, upon paying the rent and performing 
the other covenants of this Lea^e to be performed by Tenant, shall peaceably 
and ouiedy have, hold and enjoy the Premises for the full term of this Lease 
and as the same may be extended as provided herein. 
Landlord covenants chat: (a) as of the date of this Lease, the Premises 
are subject to no leases or tenancies and the Shopping Center, including the 
Premises, is subject to no restrict ions* agreements, violations, mortgages, 
encumbrances, l iens, easements or defects in title of any nature whatsoever • 
other than those specifically se t forth in Schedule "I" attached hereto and made 
a part hereof; (b) as of the commencement date of the original term of this Lease, 
the Premises are subject to no lea.sea or tenancies, except those listed on Schedule 
"I" and this Lease; (c) as of the commencement date of the original term of this 
Lease, the Premises, are subject to no restrictions, agreements, violations, mort-
gages." encumbrances, l i e n s , easements or defects in title of any nature whatsoever 
except those listed on Schedule "I" and those approved,in writing by Tenant (which 
approval shall not be unreasonably withheld); provided, that this shall not modify 
the provisions of the article here in entitled "MORTGAGE BY LANDLORD; • and id) 
as of a date no later than the commencement of the original term of this Lease, the 
Premises are subject to no zoning or other restrictions which would prohibit the. 
operation by Tenant of a drug s tore and general mercantile business on the Premises 
or prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages on or from the Premises (if not prohibited 
by law and if Tenant obtains all necessary licenses at Tenant's expense) . 
Promptly after execut ion of this Lease, Landlord shall furnish 
Tenant, without cost to Tenant , an abstract of title, copy of title insurance 
policy, preliminary title report or other evidence of title satisfactory to Tenant* 
showing that Landlord's title to the Premises is in the condition required by 
this article. Landlord further agrees when requested by Tenant in writing, 
to forthwith provide Tenant with a current survey of the Shopping Center 
showing (he location of all b u i l d i n g s in the Shopping Center in relation to the 
legal description of the Shopping Center if Landlord has obtained such a survey . 
The first such survey shall be provided by Landlord without cost 10 Tenant, 
but Tenant shall bear the full cos t of any additional requested surveys. 
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If Landlord grants this Lease by virtue of a leasehold interest 
held by it, Landlord shall forthwtth provide Tcr.ant u>uh a fully executed copy 
of the agreement and any amendments thereto creating Landlord's interest 
and shall immediately upon receipt thereof, provide Tenant with a copy of 
all notices received by La-ndlord from its lessor involving ir.y possible default 
or other breach affecting Landlord's leasehold interest herein. If Landlord 
defaults in the performance of any of the provisions c: such lease. Tenant 
may make such payments and cure such default on benalf of Landlord. Tenant 
may make payment of any defaults thereunder and Landlord agrees to reimburse 
Tenant upon demand the amounts so paid by Tenant, together with interest 
chereon at the rate of lOh per annum or the highest legal rate, whichever is 
lower and. regardless of who may own Landlord's interest in this Lease at 
the lime. Tenant may withhold ail payments of rent or other sums then or thereafter 
due Landlord hereunder until the amounts withheld equal ihe amounts so paid 
by Tenant, with interest thereon as aforesaid, which have not been reimbursed 
by Landlord. 
(7) NUISANCE. Tenant with respect to the Premises and Landlord 
with respect to the Common Areas and any other property in or adjacent to 
the Shopping Center owned or controlled by Landlord, shall not suffer or permit 
the maintenance of any nuisance (including unusual noises and obnoxious 
odors) or any use which wi l l increase the fire hazards. 
(8) COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS . Tenant agrees not to violate any 
health, building or zoning law, ordinance or regulation of any governmental 
authority applicable to the building on the Premises and, if required by such 
governmental authority . sole ly by reason of Tenant's type of'cosiness* Tenant 
will make nonstrucrurai repa irs , improvements and alterations to the interior 
of the building on the Premises . Landlord agrees to make all other repairs , 
improvements or alterations to the Premises ind to die Common Areas required 
by governmental authorities. If, by reason of the making of such repairs . 
improvements or alterations by Landlord or by Tenant, Tenant is deprived 
of the use or benefit of all or a substantial part of the Premises, rent shall 
be abated or reduced according to the extent to which Tenant is deprived of 
such use or benefit. Ail such repairs , improvements and alterations shall 
be done in accordance with plans and specifications approved by Landlord 
and Tenant. 
(9) UTILITIES . Tenant agrees to pay aU charges for electricity, 
gas and water used by Tenant on the premises if the same are separately metered 
to Tenant. Landlord shall provide a complete heating and cooling system for 
the Premises in accordance with plans and specifications approved by the part ies 
pursuant to the article entitled "PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS.11 Landlord 
shall provide the faci l i t ies , up to the exterior wall of the building on the P r e m i s e s . 
through which electricity, g a s , water, heat, air conditioning, telephone and 
other utility services are supplied to the interior of such building. 
(10) SICNS . Tenant shall have Lhe right to maintain such s igns 
on the interior of the Premises as Tenant deems advisable, including such 
signs as are visible from the exterior. Tenant may erect, maintain and replace 
signs on the exterior of the building to be constructed on the ?remisa or e x t e n d -
ing therefrom of such s i z e and kind as are provided in the plans and specifications 
approved by the parries pursuant to the article entitled "PLANS AND SPECIFICA-
TIONS" and such other Signs whether of the sa/ne or different size or kind 
as Tenant deems advisable: provided, that lar.dlcrd shall have the right to approve 
any change in Tenant's external signs (which approval shall not be unreasonably 
withheld) if such change is substantially different from Tenant's sign approved 
pursuant to the article entitled "Pt^NS AND SPECIFICATIONS" and is substantially 
different from other s i g n s then existing in the Shopping Center, In no event 
shall a change of Tenant's name on any sign require Landlord's approval. Signs 
of any sublessee or as s ignee of Tenant shall be subject to Landlord's approval. 
which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. If Landlord installs a 
pylon sign for the purpose of designating tenants in the Shopping Center, 
it is agreed that Tenant shal l have as equal prominence of designation on such 
sign as Landlord's other tenants. 
(11) FIXTURES , Tenant may install on the Premises such shelving . 
frade fixtures and equipment as Tenant deems desirable. All of said items ~ 
installed by and at the expense of Tenant shall remain Tenant's property whether 
or not affixed or attached to the Premises. At any time during the term and 
for 30 days after the expiration or termination of this Lease, Tenant may remove 
s\id items fe-am the P r e m i s e s , repairing any damage caused by such removal 
(which shall not include redecorating or repainting) but Tenant shall not be 
obligated to remove such items or to restore the Premises to its condition at 
the commencement of the term. 
(12) REPAIRS . Landlord agrees to make and pay for ail repairs. 
structural or otherwise . to the exterior of the building on the Premises (including 
\v;-w.iu: l;,—*:s:isn. thn reef, foundation and structural supports, walls, gutter* 
and downspouts, but excluding plate glass and exterior doors) and to all p ipes , 
wires, conduits, s e w e r s , drains and all other utility facilities through which 
electricity, g a s . water , heat , air conditioning, telephone and other utility 
services are suppl ied to the interior of the building up to the exterior line 
of such building; p r o v i d e d . Landlord shall not be obligated to^rnake asid pay 
for any such rap airs if the need for the same is caused by the negligent act 
or omission of Tenant un les s the cost of making such repairs is covered by 
any insurance maintained by Landlord, in which event Landlord shall be obligated 
to make and pay for such repairs . Landlord further agrees to make and pay 
for all repairs to the interior of such building which may be of z structural 
nature and which are not made necessary by any unusual or negligent use 
of the Premises by Tenant and such other repairs, structural or otherwise, 
to the interior of the building as may be necessary by reason of Landlord's 
failure to maintain the exter ior . 
Landlord shal l be liable for all loss, damage or injury to Tenants 
Premises, trade f ix tures , suppl ies , inventory, other property on the Premises 
and loss of bus ines s result ing from any overflow, leakage or defect of exterior 
walls, roof, foundation or structural supports, or from any leakage or defect 
of any utility facilities which Landlord is required to provide and maintain, 
or from the failure of Landlord to make any repairs required to be made by 
Landlord, or from Landlords negligence, or from faulty construction (unless 
such construction was performed by Tenant) provided, that except for loss , 
damage or injury caused by Landlord's negligence or from faulty construction. 
Landlord shall not be l iable [or any such loss, damage or injury unless Land-
lord has been notified of the nctd for repairs and failed to make the same with 
due diligence. Tenant agrees to promptly notify Landlord of the need to make 
any repairs of which Tenant is aware, which are required herein to be made by 
Landlord. 
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I£ by reason of the making of repairs required to be made by Landlord. 
Tenant is deprived of ihe use or benefit of ail or a part at the Premises, rent 
shall be abated or reduced according to the extent to which Tenant is deprived 
of such use or benefit. 
Landlord agrees that if in an emergency it shall become necessary 
to make any repairs hereby required, to be made by Landlord and Landlord 
cannot be located by telephone and the cost of such repairs shall not exceed 
$200, Tenant may. at its option, have the repairs made and pay the cost thereof 
and, in such event, Landlord agrees to reimburse Tenant therefor upon demand, 
or, if not so re imbursed. Tenant may deduct the amount so expended by it 
from any rent or other suras due Landlord from Tenant, 
Tenant agrees to make ana* pay for all repairs and replacements to the 
interior of the building oa the Premises (including the repair and replacement " 
of plate glass and exterior doors) except such repairs as are herein to be made 
by Landlord, Tenant agrees to make and pay for repairs and replacements of 
mechanical equipment on the Premises furnished and installed by Landlord for the 
use of Tenant and Landlord hereby assigns to Tenant and agrees that Tenant shall 
have the benefit of any guarantees oi manufacturers, dealers or installers 
of such mechanical equipment, which guarantees Tenant may enforce in its 
own name or in the name or Landlord. At the expiration or termination of this 
Lease Tenant shall not be obligated to make any repairs or replacements of 
such mechanical equipment and Landlord agrees to accept it in its then existing 
condition. 
Landlord a g r e e s to maintain the exterior of the building on the Prem-
ises which, if needed, sha l l include painting thereof. 
0 3 } ALTERATIONS . Landlord agrees thai Tenant may. at any 
time and at its e x p e n s e , make such alterations, add icons and changes in and 
to the building on the Premises as Tenant deems advisable, except that Tenant 
shall not thereby change the fire walls , make structural changes, or change 
the exterior architectural appearance of such building without the written consent 
of Landlord, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. The closing, 
relocation, alteration or other change to any door or opening into the building 
on the Premises shall in no event be deemed a change requiring the consent 
of Landlord. All such work shall be done in accordance with all applicable 
building and zoning laws and regulations and workmen1 s compensation and 
labor laws. Tenant shal l not permit the lien of any contractor* subcontractor, 
mechanic, materialman, Laborer, architect or of any other person arising out 
o£ such alterations, additions or changes made by Tenant to be or remain a 
lien upon the Premises u n l e s s the same is being contested in good faith by 
Tenant and. in any e v e n t . Tenant shall indemnify and save Landlord harmless 
from any such l i en . 
(14) INDEMNIFICATION. Tenant shall not be responsible or liable 
for and Landlord agrees to indemnify and de(cnd Tenant from all claims, damages. 
ex^eixscs. l iabilities and judgments for injury to persons, loss of life or damage 
to property occurring in the Shopping Center (including the exterior of the 
entrance to the building oa the Premises) and on the streets and sidewalks 
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adjacent to the Shopping Center or growing out of or connected with the use , 
non-use, condition or occupation of the Shopping Center or of such streets 
and sidewalks, except such injury, loss of U£e*br damage occurring in the 
interior of the building on the Premises after such building has been constructed 
in accordance with plan.s and specifications approved by Tenant and exclusive 
possession thereof de l ivered to Tenant. Landlord shall not be liable for damage 
or injury occasioned by the negligence of Tenant, its designated agents, servants , 
or employees unless covered by any insurance maintained by Landlord. Landlord1 
liability under this paragraph shall be reduced by the net proceeds from any 
insurance carried by Landlord to the extent such proceeds are applied towards 
payment of such c la ims , damages, expenses, liabilities and judgments. 
Landlord shall not be responsible or liable for md Tenant agrees 
to indemnify and defend Landlord from all claims, damages, expenses, liabilities 
and judgments for injury to persons , loss of life or damage to property occurring 
within the interior of the building on the Premises after completion of the construc-
tion thereof in accordance with plans and specifications approved by Tenant 
and after exclusive p o s s e s s i o n thereof is delivered to Tenant. Tenant shall 
not be liable for damage or injury occasioned by the negligence of Landlord, 
its designated agents , servants or employees unless covered by insurance 
maintained by Tenant . Tenant's liability under this paragraph shall be reduced 
by the net proceeds from any insurance carried by Tenant to the extent such 
proceeds are applied towards payment of such claims, damages, expenses. 
liabilities and judgments . 
Landlord and Tenant hereby waive any rights each may have 
against the other on account at any loss or damage occasioned to Landlord or 
Tenant, as the case »a.y b e , their respective property, the Premises (or its 
contents) or to other portions of the Shopping Center, arising from any risk 
generally covered by fire and extended coverage insurance; whether or not 
the insurance proceeds arc sufficient to cover the loss; and the parties each, 
on behalf of their respec t ive insurance companies insuring the property of 
either Landlord or Teztaxtt against any such loss, waive any right of subrogation 
that it may have against Landlord or Tenant, as the case may be. 
The prov i s ions of this article shall not apply to damage to or des truc-
tion of property which i s owned by Landlord or Tenant and as to such properry, 
each party waives and re leases any claim or cause of action for such damage 
or destruction except as specifically provided in the articles entitled "REPAIRS" 
and "DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION," it being agreed that each party shall provide 
their own insurance or shal l assume the risk of such damage or destruction 
even though such damage or destruction is caused or contributed to by the 
fault or neglect of the o ther . 
(15) LIABILITY INSURANCE. •Landlord-agrees to maintain or cause 
to be maintained on Landlord's behalf, liability insurance against claims for 
bodily injury, death or property damage occurring on. in or about the Shopping 
Center (including the bui ld ings therein) and the streets and sidewalks adjacent 
to the Shopoing Center , with limits of not less than 51,000,000 for total claims for 
bodily injury iiabillcy for any one occurrence and not less than $100,000 properry 
damage or, in lieu thereof, a Combined Single Limi* of not less than SI .000,000. 
Landlord shall provide Tenant with sufficient evidence of such coverage and shaiV 
name Tenant as an additional insured therein. 
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Tenant agrees to maintain insurance covering the inferior of the 
building on :he Premises agamst claims of bodily injury liability and property 
damage liability with the capability of paying claims to limits or not less than 
SZSO,000 for claims of any one person r.at less than 51,000,000 for total claims 
of any one occurrence and not less than £100,000 property damage or, in lieu 
thereof, a Combined Single Limit at not less than 11,000,000. Such insurance *
 v-
may be in the form of blanket liability coverage applicable to the Premises ~ ^ J * V*" 
'worth of more than rwen:y million dollars, Tenant may insure in whole or in ,w-^T 
part under any plan of self insurance which Tenant may from time to time have r t^ ' ' 
in force and etfect, Tenant shall provide Landlord with sufficient evidence
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of such coverage and a description of any such plan of self-insurance, 
All policies of such bodily injury liability and property damage ;"JT~ 
liability insurance shall specifically insure the performance by Landlord or 
Tenant, as the case may be , of the indemnity agreement contained in the article 
entitled "INDEMNIFICATION ,» Each party shall deliver to the other, a statement 
of that party's insurance company that such insurance specifically insures 
the performance by Landlord or Tenant, as the case may be, of the indemnity 
agreement to limits not less than those specified in this article- Each party 
shall promptly notify the other party of any asserted claim with respect to 
which such party is or m&y be indemniized against hereunder, and shall deliver 
to such party copies of process and pleadings. 
(16) FBIE LMSURANCE. Landlord agrees to keep the building 
on the Premises insured against loss or damage by fire and the penis commonly 
covered under the standard extended coverage endorsement to die extent of 
the replacement value thereof, including aJl improvements, alterations, additions 
and changes made by Landlord or Tenant (even if caused by the negligence 
of Tenant) , but excluding fixtures and equipment owned by Tenant, Such 
insurance shall be carried for the protection of both Landlord and Tenant and 
Tenant shall be named as one of the insured in all policies o£ such insurance 
o r , in lieu thereof, the policy shall contain an express waiver of any right 
of subrogation against Tenant. Ac any time during the terra of this Lease or any 
extension thereof. Tenant -aay notify Landlord that Tenant will maintain and pay 
for such insurance as \s required by this article, in which event Landlord shall 
not be obligated to provide such insurance. 
Such insurance policy shall contain a provision that the insurance 
company will give Tenant 20 days notice in writing in advance-of any cancella-
tion or lapse , or the effective date of any reduction in the amounts oi insurance, 
Landlord shall provide Teaant'with satisfactory evidence of such insurance 
coverage . The proceeds of such insurance in case of loss or damage shall 
be used by Landlord to restore the Premises as provided in this Lease to the 
extent that such proceeds arc required for such purposes. 
^Tenant agrees to reimburse Landlord for the amount ot the insurance^ 
premium within 3Q days alter receipt by Tenant of a statement setting forth the 
amount of such premium attributable to the building on the Premises as determined 
by the insurance company . U Tenant elects to maintain and pay for such insurance 
as is required by this arr.cle. Tenant shill net be obligated to reimburse Landlord 
/or any insurance premium paid by Landlord beyond the premium period in effect 
when Tenant's in$ur%t\c^ commences (or for twelve calendar months from the date 
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Tenant's notice to insure i s g i ^ e n , whichever period is shorter) and Tenant shall 
be entUled to a proportionate amount of any insurance premium refunded to Land-
lord. All amounts paid by Tenant pursuant to this article may be deducted by 
Tenant from any percentage rent due for the calendar year in which such insurance 
premiums are reimbursed by Tenant; provided, if at any one time. Tenant reim-
burses Landlord for i n s u r a n c e premiums providing coverage lor more than one 
year. Tenant may deduct from percentage rent for the current calendar year and 
for each subsequent year or part thereof for which such premiums are paid, the 
pro rata share of such re imbursement attributable to each year or portion thereof 
of insurance coverage. 
(17) DAMAGE CR DESTRUCTION. Zf the Premises, the appurtenances 
thereto, or the Common A r e a s shall be damaged or destroyed by fire or other 
casualty or any other cause what soever , Landlord will forthwith proceed with 
due diligence to remove aJiy d e b r i s and to restore '-he Premises and the Common 
Areas, as the case may b e . to substantially the same condition as immediately 
prior to such damage or d e s t r u c t i o n , including any improvements or alterations 
thereon made by Landlord or T e n a n t . 
If Tenant is d e p r i v e d of the use or benefit of any substantial portion 
of the Premises either by r c a s a a of such damage or destruction or during the 
period of restoration and repair, rent shall be abated or reduced according 
to the extent to which Tenant is so deprived of such use or benefit. 
If such work for restoration and repair has not been completed 
within rAnt (?) months after the occurrence of any such damage or destruction. 
Tenant may tevminat* this Lea^e effective ai cf the date of such damage or 
destruction by giving not ice thereof to Landlord and consenting to the release 
of any insurance p r o c e e d s . 
Should such daxaage or destruction occur during the last \ years 
of the original term of this L e a s e or during any extended term thereof. Tenant 
or Landlord may terminate th i s Lease effective as of the date of such damage 
or destruction by giving n o t i c e thereof to the other party not later, than forty-
Eve (45) days after such d a m a g e or destruction. 
If at any time d u r i n g the original term or during any option term, 
the buildings then comprising- the Shopping Center shall be so extensively 
damaged that 50% or more of -he rentable space therein Is rendered untenantable 
and regardless of whether the Premises be damaged in*such happening: 
(a) From the date of such damage or destruction and until 
the Shopping C e n t e r is completely restored to its loraer condition 
and made t e n a n t a b l e . no installments of annual rent shall be 
payable or sha l l b e or become due; and 
(b) Tenant may terminate this Lease effective as of the date 
of such damage b y giving notice thereof to Landlord, unless ( i ) 
within forty- f ive (45) days after the occurrence of such damage 
Landlord g i v e s not i ce to Tenant that it intends to repair and restore 
the Shopping C e s t e r to substantially the same condition as prior 
to such damage and commences such work of restoration and 
repair, and ( i i ) wi th in nine (9) months after the occurrence of 
such damage, the Shopping Center is so restored. 
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In the even: of any termination a: this Lease pursuant to this arncle, 
rent shall he paid IQ the effective date of termination ^nd Tenant snail be enmicd 
to a refcad of any rent paid for any period aitcr said effective date. 
(18) CONDEMNATION . If any portion of or interest in ;he Shopping 
Center, including without limitation, the Premises, the Common Areas or any 
of the buildings in the Shopping Center shall be condemned or taken by any 
public authority or by any other person or corporation under any statute, 
by eminent domain ar by purchase in lieu thereof, and such condemnation 
or Uk;ng rzndcrs the Premises unsuitable in the judgment of Tenant for Tenant's 
business operations (which determination by Tenant shall not be unreasonably 
made), Tenant may terminate this Lease by giving notice thereof to Landlord 
not later than 60 days alter possess ion is taken by the condemning authority. 
e lect ive as of the date said notice is given; provided, in no event may Tenant 
terminate this Lease if only a portion of the Common Areas is so condemned 
or taken and af;er such condemnation or taking, the entrances and exits to the Shop-
ping Center remain or are relocated to the approval of Tenant (which shall not be 
unreasonably withheld) , less than a total of ten percent (1*0%) a£ che Common Area is 
so condemned and the parking area is within reasonable and similarly convenient prox-
imity to the Premises. Rent shall be paid to the effective date of termination and Tenant 
shall be entitled to a proportionate reiund of any rent paid for any period after 
said effective date. If Tenant does not elect eo terminate, Landlord shall restore 
the Shopping Center to a complete architectural and merchandising unit, all 
in accordance with plans and specifications approved by Tenant. Any amounts 
awarded to Landlord as a resuir of such condemnation cr taking shall be used 
for such restoration to the extent required, If this Lease is not so terminated, 
it shall continue, except that commencing with the date on which Tenant is 
deprived of the use ox any portion of the P r e m i t s or of any rights under this 
Lease, rent shall be abated or reduced according to the extent to which Tenant 
i s deprived of the use or benefit of the Premises or oi such rights. 
Whether or net this Lease is terminated as a result of any such 
condemnation or taking, both Landlord and Tenant shall he free to sake claim 
against the condemning party for the amount of actual provable damage done 
to each of them as a result of such condemnation and shall share in any award 
made as their interests may appear. 
(19) MORTGAGE BY LANDLORD. Tenant enters into and accepts 
this Lease and the leasehold interest and estate of Tenant hereunder subject 
and subordinate to any first mortgage or first trust deed which may now or 
hereafter be executed upon, or with, respect to, the Premises7, and any renewal 
or extension of any such mortgage or trust decdi provided, that such subordin-
ation shall not apply to any such mortgage or trust deed which does not provide 
(or whose owner or holder docs not in writing agree) that (i) this Lease shall 
not be terminated and the possess ion of Tenant hereunder shall not be disturbed 
by reason of any foreclosure or sale or other proceeding taken in connection 
with any such mortgage or trust deed, and (ii) that the Uen of such mortgage 
or trust deed shall not aifect any fixtures, equipment or property owned or 
removable by Tenant. Tenant may make payment of any defaults under any 
such mortgage or crust d^d and Landlord agrees to reimburse Tenant upon 
demand the amounts so paid by Tenant, together with interest thereon at the 
rate of 10% per annum or the highest legal rate, whichever is lower, and regard-
less of who may own Landlord's interest, in this Lease at the time. Tenant may 
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withhold all payments of rent or other sums thenar thereafter due Landlord 
hereunder until the amounts withheld equal the amounts so paid by Tenant, 
with interest thereon as aforesaid, which have not been reimbursed by Landlord. 
(20) UNPERFORMED COVENANTS CF LANDLORD. If Landlord 
fails to make any repairs or do any work required ax Landlord by the provisions 
of this Lease or in any other respect fails to perform any of the covenants, 
terms or conditions ax this Lease to be performed by Landlord and such default 
continues for a period of 30 days aiter written demand for performance is given 
by Tenant, then and in any of such events, Tenant may make such payments 
and cure such defaults on behalf of Landlord ind, in connection therewith, 
do all work and make all payments deemed necessary by Tenant, including 
costs and charges in connection with any legal action which may have been 
commenced or threatened. Landlord agrees to reimburse Tenant upon demand 
the amounts so paid by Tenant , together wich interest thereon at the rate of 
10% ptr annum or the h ighest legal rate, whichever is lower, md regardless 
of who may own Landlord's interest in this Lease at the time, so long as not 
prohibited by Landlord's mortgage or other financing to which this Lease is 
subordinate. Tenant may withhold all payments of rent or other sums then 
or thereafter due Landlord until the amounts withheld equal the amounts so 
paid by Tenant, with interest thereon as aforesaid, which have not been reimbursed 
by Landlord. 
Tenant may not make any payment pursuant to this article of any 
tax. assessment, encumbrance or other obligation affecting the Premises so 
long as Landlord is contesting the amount or validity of any-such obligation 
in good faith and until s u c h contest has been judicially determined or otherwise 
settled and thereafter Landlord fails or refuses to pay the same. 
If at the expiration of this Lease or any extension thereof there 
6hall be any sums owing by Landlord to Tenant, Tenant may, so long as not 
prohibited by Landlord's mortgage or other financing to which this Lease is 
subordinate, by giving written notice to Landlord', extend this Lease until 
January 31st of the year following the date when the indebtedness of Landlord 
to Tenant would have been fully paid by application of the annual rent to such 
indebtedness, but in no event shall such extension exceed 5 years. 
(21) UNPERFORMED COVENANTS OF TENANT. If Tenant shall 
default in the performance of any of the terms or previsions of this Lease other 
than the provisions requir ing the payment of rent or other sums of money* 
and if Tenant shall fail to cure such default within 30 days afier receipt of 
written notice thereof from Landlord, or. if the default is of such character 
as to require more than 30 days to cure and Tenant shall fail to use reasonable 
diligence in curing such default, Landlord may not forfeit or terminate this 
Lease or prohibit or res tr ic t the use or enjoyment of the Premises by Tenant 
by reason of such default , but Landlord shall have any other remedy provided 
by law, In addition, Landlord may cure such default for the account and at 
the expense of Tenant and all sums so expended by Landlord, including costs and 
charges in connection with any legal action which may have been threatened or 
commenced, together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum or the 
highest legal rate, wh ichever is lower, shall be paid by Tenant-on demand. 
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C22) DEFAULT BY TENANT. If any one or more of the following 
event* (fyerein called "default") shall happen *nd be continuing namely: 
(a) Tenant shall fail to pay any rent or other sum of money 
to Landlord when the same is due and such failure continues 
for 15 days after Landlord has given Tenant written notice 
specifying the amount due; 
(b) Tenant shall file a voluntary pttuion ir. bankruptcy 
or a petition or answer seeking a reorganization, arrangement, 
composition, readjustment, liquidation, dissolution or other 
relief of the same or different kind under any provision of the 
Bankruptcy Ac: or Tenant shall make an assignment for the 
benefit a£ creditors; 
(c ) An involuntary petition in bankruptcy again*t 
Tenant or petition or answer made by a person other than 
Tenant seek ing a reorganisation, arrangement, composition, 
readjustment, liquidation, dissolution or other relief against 
Tenant of the same or different kind under any provision of 
the Bankruptcy Act is filed or if a receiver is appointed having 
jurisdiction ox the business property or assets of Tenant 
on the P r e m i s e s , and. in any of such events. If Tenant shall 
not properly commence and expeditiously pursue action to 
dismiss any such involuntary petition or answer or to vacate 
such rece iversh ip and, if after diligently exhausting Tenant's 
remedies , such petition shall not be dismissed or the receiver* 
ship vacated; 
then, and in any of such e v e n t s . Landlord shall have the immediate right to 
re-enter the Premises and expel Tenant or any person, or persons occupying 
tho same, with or without legal process , and in any such event. Tenant agrees 
to peacefully and quietly yie ld up and surrender the Premises to Landlord; 
provided, if a default occurs under subparagraph "(a)" above and there be 
a bona fide dispute as to the existence of such default or of the amount due 
and all undisputed amounts are paid, said 15 day period specified in subparagraph 
•(a)" shall not commence to run until such dispute is settled by final court 
decree, arbitration or mutual agreement. 
Should Landlord elect to re-enter as herein provided or to take 
possession pursuant to legal proceedings, or otherwise. Landlord may either 
terminate this Lease by g iv ing written notice to Tenant or from time to time 
and without terminating this Lease, relet the Premises or any part thereof 
for such term or terms (which may be for a term extending beyond the term 
of this Lease) and at such rental or rentals and upon such other terms and 
conditions as Landlord deems advisable; provided that Landlord shall use 
its best efforts to obtain the best rent available thereon. Upon any such reletting, 
Tenant shall be immediately liable to pay to Landlord the cost and expense 
of such reletting, the cost of any alterations and repairs deemed necessary 
by Landlord to effect such reletting and the amount, if any, by which the annual 
rent reserved in this Lease for the period of such reletting (but not beyond 
the term of this Lease) exceeds the amount agreed to be paid as rent for the 
Premises for such period of relett ing, If Tenant has been credited with any 
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rent to be received from such reletting and such rent shall not be promptly 
paid to Landlord by the new tenant. Tenant shall immediately be liable to pay 
such deficiency to Landlord. If Landlord elects :Q terminate this Lease, written 
notice to that effect specifying the ei(ec:\v/e date of termination shall be given 
by Landlord to Tenant and in such event, Landlord may recover from Tenant 
all damages Landlord may incur by reason of Tenant's failure to pay rent. 
including the cost of recovering the Premises and including the excess of the 
annual rent reserved in this Lease for phe remainder of the anginal term (or 
any extended term then in effect) over the then reasonable rental value of 
the Premises for (he remainder of such term, all of which amounts shall be 
immediately due and payable by Tenant to Landlord. 
(23) COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES. The costs, including reasonable 
attorneys' fees, of any action brought to enforce any of the terms or provisions 
of this Lease, shall be borne by the party adjudged by the court to have violated 
any of the terms or provis ions of this Lease, 
(24) NOTICES AND PLACE FOR PAYMENT OF RENT. Any notice 
or demand given or served by either party to this Lt&st to the other shall 
nol be deemed to have been duly given or acrv^d unless in writing and forwarded 
by certified or registered mail (return receipt requested), postage prepaid, 
addressed as follows: 
To the Landlord at: 351 California Street 
San Francisco. California 94104 
To the Tenant at: Post Office Box 65S 
Salt Lake Ciry, Utah 84110 
Rent shall be paid to Landlord at the address set forth in this 
article. No successor to Landlord's interest shall be entitled to receive rent 
payments until Tenant shall have been furnished with (a) a letter signed by 
the grantor of such interest setting forth the name and address of the person 
entitled to receive such rent and (b) a photostatic copy of the deed or other 
instrument by which such interest passed. 
The person and the place to which notices are to be mailed may 
be changed by either party by written notice to (he ot^er party. 
(25) PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS. Landlord agrees to construct 
a building an the Premises in accordance with plans and specifications approved 
in writing by Tenant but prepared at Landlord's expense. Tenant shall cooperate 
with Landlord in the furnishing of all necessary information» plans and sketches 
to show Tenants requirements for such building. If on or before October i , 1974. 
final plans and specifications have not been approved by Tenant, Landlord or 
Tenant may terminate this Lease by giving noiice thereof to the other parry. Upon 
approval in writing of final plans and specifications by Tenant. Landlord shall o b -
tain a building permit and dil igently proceed with the construction of the building 
on the Premises . If such construction is not commenced on or before January 
1. 1975, Tenant may terminate this Lease by giving notice thereof to Landlord. 
If such construction is commenced prior to approval in writing by Tenant of 
final plans and soecif ications. Tenant may at any lime prior to the.commencement 
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ot the original term of ih;a Lease , do any OP all of jhe following: terminate 
this Lease by giving n c a e e thereof to Landlord, gbum injunctive relief against 
Landlord, recover all damages suffered by Tenant or exercise *ny other remedy 
a: law or in equity. 
(2o) CONSTRUCTION PERIOD . Dur;ng the period of construction 
of the building on the Premised. Landlord agrees that Tenant through its proper 
representatives, shall at ail times have access to the work at the Premises 
or wherever it may be ;a preparation and Landlord will provide proper facilities 
for such access and for inspect ion of the work. U Tenant condemns any work 
or material as failing eo conform to the plans ^nd specifications approved in 
wricing by Tenant or as the same may have been changed with the written approval 
of Tenant, Landlord, without expense to Tenant, shall promptly remove all 
such condemned material and promptly replace all condemned work and all 
work damaged or destroyed by any defective workmanship and material or 
by its removal and shall replace the same with materials or workmanship conform-
ing to the plans and specifications approved by Tenant. Provided, that if Landlord 
disagrees with any such condemnation of work or material. Landlord and Tenant 
shall select an independent architect who shall, within forty-eight (48) hours 
after the matter is submitted to him, decide whether or not such work or material 
conforms fo the plans arid specifications and Landlord and Tenant agree to be 
bound by such decision* 
Landlord agrees that Tenant may enter the Premises prior to comple-
tion of the construction of the bu i ld in - cci the Prssaiaa: for the purpose i f instal-
lation of its shelving, trade fixtures and equipment and such entry shall not 
be considered as an acceptance of the Premises by Tenant. Tenant agrees 
that shelving, trade fixtures and equipment will be installed in such a way 
that the work of construction wil l not be interfered with unduly. 
{17) COMMENCEMENT OF ORIGINAL TERM. The original term 
of this Lease shall not commence until the following conditions occur; 
(a) The bui lding on the Premises is completed in 
accordance with plans and specifications approved by 
Tenant, e x c l u s i v e possess ion of the Premises is delivered 
to Tenant and either (;) 30 days shall elapse after 
possession is so de l ivered or Cu) Tenant opens for 
business on the Premises prior to the expiration of such 
30 day per iod , whichever first occurs; 
(b) Adequate means of access as shown on Exhibit 
"A" to and frorn the Premises are ready for use. the 
parking areas in the Shopping Center are hard surfaced 
and striped for automobile parking and such parking 
areas and other portions of the Common Areas are 
substantially complete and adequately lighted: 
(c) Construction of small shops located either between or to 
the side of the major tenants as outlined in yellow on Exhibit UA" 
shall have been completed; 
(d) Tenant shall have been furnished proof 
satisfactory to it that the following tenants have entered 
into leases with Landlord for space in the Shopping 
Center at the locations indicated on Exhibit *A», for the 
following terms and for an area not less than that 
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indicaied and. in addition, such tenants shall have 
opened for bus iness at such locations or be in possession 
of such space and obligated to open far business therein 
prxor to or contemporaneously wvth Tenant's opening 
tar bus iness on the Premises: 
Tenant Term Square Footage 
Safeway 25 years 20,000 
(c) Tenant shall have been furnished prooj satisfactory \o it that 
Ernst Hardware Cor a comparable tenant approved by Tenant, which 
approval shall not be unreasonably withheld) has entered into a lease 
with Landlord at the location indicated on Exhibit "A" for a minimum 
term of 25 years and a minimum square Rootage of 36,000 square feet. 
Such tenant shall be obligated to open for business therein on a date 
no later than s ix (6) months from the date Tenant ap*&s for business. 
Tenant may occupy the Premises and open for business thereon before 
all of said conditions have been fulfilled but such action shall not be considered a 
waiver of such conditions. For any period after Tenant so opens for business 
prior to the occurrence of all such conditions. Tenant shall pay to Landlord as 
rent for the Premises an amount equal to 1-1/2% of Tenant's gross sales computed 
as provided in the article entitled "PERCENTAGE RENT" made in or from the 
Premises during the period after Tenant opens for business and until the commencement 
of the original term of this Lease, such rent to be paid to Landlord in a lump sum 
not later than SO days alter the commencement of the original term of this Lease, 
The gross sales during such period prior to the commencement of the original 
term of this Lease shall not be taken into account in the computation of the 
rtnt provided for in the article entitled "PERCENTAGE RENT" in respect to 
the Calendar year in which the original term of this Lease commences. 
If such conditions occur after any September 15th and prior to 
the succeeding January 1st, Tenant may, in its discretion, accept possession 
of the Premises, but shall not be obligated to pay rent until the succeeding 
January 31st, unless Tenant opens for business on the Premises prior to said 
date. 
CBS) ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLETTING. Tenant may sublet the 
Premises or any portion thereof or assign this Lease for any lawful purpose. 
Tenant shall, except where such assignment or subletting is to a corporation or 
other business related to Tenant by way of merger, joint venture or is a related 
company or subsidiary of Tenant, give notice to Landlord of its intent \o sublease 
qr ass ign. Landlord shall have fifteen (15) days after such notice is given to 
notify Tenant that it d isapproves of such action; otherwise, Landlord's approval 
shall be deemed to be g i v e n . If Landlord disapproves Tenant's contemplated assign* 
ment or subletting, Tenant may terminate this Lease by giving notice thereof to 
Landlord, such termination to be effective as of the date stated in the notice. 
In the event of such assignment or subletting, Tenant shall remain liable to 
Landlord as guarantor of the performance of all the terms, conditions and provi-
sions of this Lease to be performed by Tenant. 
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(29) EXECUTION OF LEASE. RECORDING. Landlord agrees to 
pay iny and all fees and commiss ions , including tinder's ices, for bringing 
about the execution and d e l i v e r y of this Lease and agrees to indemnify Tenant 
and save Tenant harmless of and from any and all claims for such tecs and 
commissions. The s i g n i n g of this Lease by Landlord does not constitute a 
completed transaction unt i l such time as this Lease shall have been accepted 
by Tenant and executed b y its proper officers. This lease agreement shall 
not be recorded, but the l ease which has been executed contemporaneously 
herewith shall be r e c o r d e d . 
(30) MISCEULANEOUS PROVISIONS. Nothing herein contained 
shall be deemed or cons trued by the parties hereto or by any third parry as-
creating the relationship of principal and agent or of partnership or of joint 
venture becu/een the p a r t i e s here to , it being understood and agreed that neither 
the method of computation of rent nor any other provision contained here in . 
nor any acts of the part ies hereto * shall be deemed to create any relationship 
between the parties hereto other than the relationship of landlord and tenant. 
In the event TenaJit shall hold over and remain in possession of 
the Premises after the exp ira t ion of this Lease, such holding over shall not oper* 
ate as * renewal or ex tens ion of this Lease but shall only create a tenancy from -
month to month and shall b e on all of the terms and conditions of this Lease. 
Tenant a g r e e s at any time and from tine to time upon not l e s s than 
ten (10) days prior reques t b y Landlord, to execute, acknowledge and del iver 
to Landlord, a statement in wri t ing certifying the date of commencement of this 
Lease that this Lease is u n c o d i f i e d and in full force and effect (or if there have 
been modifications, stating s u c h modifications and the date *herce£) , without 
default (or if there are any ceJtaults known to Tenant generally describing the 
same) and further stating the dates to which the annual rent and other charges 
have been paid, and se t t ing forth such other matters as may reasonably be r e -
quested by Landlord* 
Except as o t h e r w i s e expressly provided in this Lease, at the exp ira -
tion or termination of this L e a s e . Tenant agrees to peaceably and promptly 
surrender possession of the Premises to Landlord in its then condition and 
Tenant shall not be r e q u i r e d to restore the Premises to its condition at the 
commencement of the or ig ina l term . 
The various r i g h t s and remedies herein contained and reserved 
to each of the parties e x c e p t as. herein otherwise expressly provided, shall 
not be considered as e x c l u s i v e of any other right or remedy of such party but 
shall be construed as cumulat ive and shall be in addition to every other remedy 
now or hereafter existing at l a w , in equity or by statute. No delay or omission 
of the right to exercise any p o w e r or remedy by either party shall impair any 
such right, power or remedy or be construed as & waiver of any default or 
non-performance or as a c q u i e s c e n c e therein. 
This Lease , a l though drafted by Tenant, shall be interpreted 
and construed only by the contents hereof and there shall be no presumption 
or standard of construction in favor of or against either Landlord or Tenant. 
The headings of the several articles and sections contained herein 
are for convenience only and do not define, limit or construe the contents of 
such articles and sec t ions . 
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When required by context, she singular shall include the plural 
and the neuter gender shall include a person, corporation, fins or association. 
If any provision of this Lease is declared invalid in a court proceed-
ing between the parties hereto, such invalidity shall not invalidate this Lease, 
and this Lease shall be construed as if the invalid part were not contained 
herein and the rights and obligations of che parties shall be construed and 
enforced accordingly. 
This Lease is and shall be considered to be the only agreement 
or understanding between the parties hereto. All negotiations and oral agreements 
acceptable to both parties have been incorporated herein* It may not be amended 
or modified by any act or conduct oi the parties or by oral agreement, unless 
reduced to writing* 
All oi the r ights and obligations of the parties undeT this Lease 
shall bind and the benefits shall inure to their respective heirs» legal representa-
tives* successors and a s s i g n s . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Lease has been executed as of the 
day and year first above written. 
HILLSIDE PLAZA ASSOCIATES, 
a partnership 
<^- ~*sa» K «©/ &L. 
Its General Parmer 
LANDLORD 
SKAGGS COMPANIES, INC. 
TENANT 
A t t e s t - Ap?f»»«j •* I-* '<•*» 
Attes c, _ ^ ^ ^ u ^ f ^ t ^ t 
Secretary 
[Corporate JSeall 




S p e c i d c l i s t of r e s t r i c t i o n s , agreements v iolat ions , mo- igagea , 
e n c u m b r a n c e s , l i e n s , c i s c m s r . u unci Se lects m i;clc^ Elect ing the Shopping 
Center and the P r e m i s e s -
(a) Taxei for rhe year 197-4, now a lien, nor ycf due or payable. 
(b) Said property l ies wtrhin rhe boundries of the Salt Lake County Cottonwood 
Sanitary Disrricr. and is subject to qil charge* and assessments thereof. 
Subjec: to payment of connection fee upon Qppl leaf ion to connecr. 
(c) Said ptoperry l ie* within rhe boundncs af fh« Salt Lake County Service A/ea 
N o , 2—Cottonwood Heights , determined and declarea to be extended services 
urhich ihclt be recreat ional facilities and services through the construct ion, 
operation ond maintenance of extended local parks and recreation facilities 
not now furnished by the County in the Cottonwood Heignrs Area, and is 
subject to all charges and assessments thereof, as recited in Ordinance 
recorded a* Entry N o , 2226327 in Book 26)6 ar Page 59 of rhe Official Records. 
(d) Right of way and easement for the Green Flake Ditch ovar and ocross the herein 
described property ( locorion not aisclased) as recited in mesne instruments af 
record. 
(e) A perpetual ecsemenf and right of way for the erection and continued 
maintenance, repair , a l terat ion, and replacement af the electric 
transmission
 f distribution ond telephone circuits of the Grantee, and 
2 guy anchors ar\d no po l e s , with the necessary guys, stubs, crasx-qrm* 
and other at tachments thereon, ar affixed thereto, for the xupport of said 
circuits, to be erecred and maintained upon and across the premises of the 
Grantor, in Solr Lake County, Utah, qiong a line described as follows: 
Two guy anchors l o c a t e d on the Grantor') land at a point 54 feet South and 
445 feet £ast, more or less , from the North one quarter corner of Section 27, 
Township 2 South, Rcnge 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, and being in the Northwest 
quorter of the Nor theas t quarter of said Section 2 7 . 
Together with all righrs of ingress and egress necessary ar convenient for the Full 
and complete use , occupat ion and enjoyment af the easement hereby granted, 
and all righrs and pr iv i l eges incident thereto, including the righr to cut ond 
remove timber, t rees , brush, overhanging branches and other obstructions which 
may injure or interfere with the Grantee's use, occupation or enjoyment of this 
easement, os gronted to (Jtoh Power 4 Light Company by Pole Line Eosemenr 
recorded November 3 0 . 1964, as Entry N o . 2044304 m Book 2265 at Page 280 
of the Off ic io! Records . 
(f) Easements over the fol lowing described real property in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah: 
Beqfnning at a point on the South line of 7000 South Street, said point being South 
89*5r3Q" East 8 8 , 5 7 feet along the Section line ond South 0°08'30" West 3 3 . 0 0 
feet from the North quarter corner of Section 27, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Bose and Mer id ian , and running thence Souih 64°0Q' East 4 5 . $ o (+*ti 
thence South 89©5l r 30 M Eos* 1967.48 feet along a line parallel to ond 2 0 , 0 feet 
from the South t in* or 7000 South Street to rhe South right of way line »o the South 
line of 7000 South Stree t , thence North aS^l 'SO" West 1849.50 feet olong South 
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tine of 7000 South Street to the point of beginning. 
The purpose of this easement il to grant and convey unto Salt Lake County, 
i n officers, employees, agents and assigns, the right to enter upon the 
above descrfbed property far the purpose of constructing a 42" concrete 
pipeline through the above described property and the Grantee, Sal) Lad* 
County, iholl ot al l times protect Grantors property from any domcge from 
the installation and maintenance of the said drainage pipeline ond shall 
reploce Grantors property to its original condition existing at the time' 
immediarely prior to doing any xork in the installation and maintenance 
of said pipeline Insofor as ir is reasonable possible to do so, as ^rant^d 
to Salt Lake Counry, a body corporate and politic, by Easement recorded 
May 24, 1967 os Entry N o . 2200599 in Book 2557 at Page 50 of the Official 
Records. 
